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The Role of Diffusion Characteristics in
Formulating a General Theory of Law and
Technology
Gaia Bernstein ∗
INTRODUCTION
A general theory of law and technology could provide policy
guidelines that improve technology regulators’ decisionmaking. Opponents of such general theory caution that
generalizations might prevent the recognition of technological
uniqueness, and that the application of broad and
indiscriminate principles could impede the identification and
appropriate social accommodation of important and novel
technologies. To overcome this objection, a general theory of
law and technology should provide fine-tuned policy principles
that identify the main characteristics differentiating
technologies while still providing a common framework that
deals with their common attributes.
In this Article, I suggest that the technological
characteristics that influence a technology’s diffusion—its
social adoption process—would provide a constructive
foundation for formulating fine-tuned policy guidelines. Policy
principles based on the identification of the technological
characteristics that influence a technology’s diffusion (diffusion
characteristics) would not apply narrowly to a specific
technology nor would they provide overly broad guidelines
relevant to all technologies. Rather, policy guidelines based on
diffusion characteristics would be appropriately attuned to both
© 2007 Gaia Bernstein.
∗
Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. This
symposium piece was adapted from Gaia Bernstein, The Paradoxes of
Technological Diffusion: Genetic Discrimination and Internet Privacy, 39
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technological differences and commonalities.
To illustrate my proposal I use case studies of privacy
controversies involving two technologies: genetic testing and
the Internet. I hope to promote the general theory project by
also showing that helpful insights can be derived from the joint
study of seemingly very different technologies. The two case
studies exhibit paradoxical relationships between privacy
protection and technological diffusion. In the case of genetic
testing, I focus on genetic discrimination. My analysis of
empirical data shows that although genetic discrimination is
rare and apparently on the decline, concerns about
discrimination preclude individuals from using genetic testing,
thereby inhibiting the diffusion of an important new
technology. At the same time, my examination of the collection
of personal information by commercial entities on the Internet
reveals a mirror-image paradox.
While use of privacythreatening devices, such as cookies is on the rise, the
increasing privacy threat has not inhibited Internet diffusion.
I suggest that by focusing on diffusion characteristics we
could accomplish two goals. First, identification of the diffusion
characteristics that made a technology susceptible to the
privacy-diffusion paradox could be useful in predicting which
technologies are likely to fall prey to a similar paradoxical
relationship.
Specifically, I argue that genetic testing’s
preventive and non-triable qualities and the Internet’s criticalmass-point quality and decentralized nature made them
vulnerable to their respective privacy-diffusion paradoxes.
Second, understanding the role of diffusion characteristics
in these controversies could serve to formulate policy guidelines
to help resolve both the controversies at issue and future
techno-privacy disputes involving similar technologies.
I
propose that where a technology, like genetic testing, exhibits
preventive and non-triable diffusion characteristics, an express
and clear-cut privacy protecting law is needed, not necessarily
to combat the privacy threat itself, but to alleviate individuals’
fears that inhibit them from using the technology. Further,
where a technology is centrally diffused, as is genetic testing,
efforts to reduce concerns are likely to be most effective when
directed at those diffusing the technology, in this case, genetic
counselors. I also suggest that when a technology, like the
Internet, has a critical mass quality and is decentrally diffused,
social norms, in this case non-privacy norms, are quickly
entrenched.
At that point, both legal and technological
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measures become less effective.
Consequently, in these
instances, timing should become an important factor in
regulators’ decision-making process.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I presents the two
privacy-diffusion paradoxes of genetic discrimination and
commercial privacy on the Internet. Part II identifies the
diffusion characteristics that made genetic testing and the
Internet susceptible to their respective paradoxes. Finally,
Part III proposes use of diffusion characteristics as a policy tool
to resolve techno-privacy controversies.
I. PRIVACY-DIFFUSION PARADOX MODELS
A. GENETIC DISCRIMINATION
The public is greatly concerned about genetic
The media,
discrimination by employers and insurers. 1
governmental organizations, and public interest organizations
spread genetic discrimination fears. 2 Furthermore, medical
professionals, particularly genetic counselors, share these
They play a major role in spreading genetic
concerns. 3
discrimination fears by warning their patients that genetic
testing could result in genetic discrimination. 4 Consequently,
1. Eighty-four percent believe that health insurance companies will deny
coverage, and 69% believe that employers will deny people jobs because of
genetic test results. See VCU CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY, VCU LIFE
SCIENCES SURVEY: AMERICANS WELCOME SCIENTIFIC ADVANCEMENTS WITH
CAUTION
(2001),
available
at
http://www.vcu.edu/lifesci/images2/survey2001.pdf.
2. See COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, GENETIC DISCRIMINATION:
POSITION
PAPER
1
(2001),
available
at
http://www.genewatch.org/educational/genetic_discrimination.pdf (warning that “an increasing
number of healthy individuals have suffered discrimination on the basis of
predictive genetic information”); Press Release, Nat’l Human Genome
Research Inst., Health Insurance in the Age of Genetics (July 1997), available
at http://www.genome.gov/10000879 (underscoring data regarding genetic
discrimination); Geoffrey Cowley et al., Flunk the Gene Test and Lose Your
Insurance, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 23, 1996, at 48; GATTACA (Sony Pictures 1997)
(depicting a future society of rigid genetic hierarchy). For a description of
genetic discrimination concerns, see LORI ANDREWS & DOROTHY NELKIN,
BODY BAZAAR: THE MARKET FOR HUMAN TISSUE IN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY AGE
82–101 (2001).
3. See Mark A. Hall & Stephen S. Rich, Laws Restricting Health
Insurers’ Use of Genetic Information: Impact on Genetic Discrimination, 66
AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 293, 295-96 (2000).
4. See Mark A. Hall & Stephen S. Rich, Genetic Privacy Laws and
Patients’ Fear of Discrimination by Health Insurers: The View from Genetic
Counselors, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 245, 247-48 (2000).
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for many individuals, genetic testing has become synonymous
with genetic discrimination.
Nevertheless, a survey I conducted of empirical research on
genetic discrimination by insurers and employers revealed
that, in fact, genetic discrimination is rare and that despite the
growth in the number of available tests, it is on the decline. 5
The prevalence of fears of discrimination despite the
absence of supporting evidence is disconcerting because of its
effect on individuals’ decisions to undergo genetic testing.
Although the decision of whether or not to undergo genetic
testing is motivated by additional factors, research has shown
that fear of genetic discrimination by insurers and employers is
the primary barrier against testing, particularly among presymptomatic adults who could test for adult onset diseases. 6
The current legal regime provides only partial and
inconsistent protection from genetic discrimination. 7 It has not
played
an
important
part
in
preventing
genetic
discrimination. 8 But, more importantly, it has not alleviated
the genetic discrimination concerns of either genetic counselors
or those contemplating the use of the technology. Studies have
shown no reduction in patients’ fears following the enactment

5. Gaia Bernstein, The Paradoxes of Technological Diffusion: Genetic
Discrimination and Internet Privacy, 39 CONN. L. REV. 243, 257-266 (2006).
6. See, e.g., Katherine P. Geer et al., Factors Influencing Patients’
Decisions to Decline Cancer Genetic Counseling Services, 10 J. GENETIC
COUNSELING 25, 30–31 (2001). For a discussion of the relevant literature, see
Bernstein, supra note 5, at 263-64. Adult onset diseases are genetic diseases
that may develop later in life, such as breast cancer, Alzheimer’s disease or
Huntington’s disease.
7. On the federal level, the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) provide only
partial protection. See Health Insurance and Portability Act of 1996, 29
U.S.C. § 1182 (2000); American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§
12101–12213 (2000); see also 3 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 902 (1995);
Edward J. Larson, The Meaning of Human Gene Testing for Disability Rights,
On the state level, genetic
70 U. CIN. L. REV. 913, 927–28 (2002).
discrimination protection is comprised of a confusing patchwork of state laws
offering inconsistent and partial protection. See Paul Steven Miller, Is There a
Pink Slip in My Genes? Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 3 J. HEALTH
CARE L. & POL’Y 225, 259–63 (2000); Nat’l Human Genome Research Inst.,
Genetic Discrimination in Health Insurance, http://www.genome.gov/10002328
(last reviewed Nov. 2006). For a survey of genetic discrimination laws, see,
John V. Jacobi, Genetic Discrimination in a Time of False Hopes, 30 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 363, 368–75 (2003).
8. Hall & Rich, supra note 3, at 297, 300-1, 304.
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of genetic discrimination laws. 9
Hence, the findings point to a privacy-diffusion
relationship that gives cause for concern.
Genetic
discrimination is rare and apparently on the decline. Yet,
misperception of the practice of genetic discrimination inhibits
the diffusion of genetic testing technology.
Genetic
discrimination laws provide partial protection at best and
contribute to the uncertainty regarding the status of privacy
protection. Consequently, the law has not been a major factor
in inhibiting genetic discrimination, nor has it been successful
in alleviating individuals’ genetic discrimination concerns, thus
failing to facilitate broader adoption of the technology.
B. INTERNET PRIVACY
With the advent of the Internet to popular use, web sites
and commercial-profiling companies began collecting personal
information, through use of cookies, spyware, and the less wellknown web bugs. Their goal was to target advertising at
Internet users and sometimes to transform Internet sites to
match a visitor’s interests and financial ability. 10
Commercial collection of personal information on the
Yet,
Internet reached public awareness in 1999–2000. 11
despite mounting public pressure, courts have not found
commercial profiling through use of cookies as compromising
individuals’ privacy. 12 Further, legislative responses focused
only on spyware and the settlements reached between
government agencies and collectors of personal information on

9. Hall & Rich, supra note 4, at 253.
10. See CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., GHOSTS IN OUR MACHINES:
BACKGROUND AND POLICY PROPOSALS ON THE “SPYWARE” PROBLEM 2 (2003);
Microsoft,
Understanding
Cookies,
http://www.microsoft.com/resources/documentation/windows/xp/all/proddocs/e
n-us/sec_cook.mspx (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).
11. See, e.g., Amid Protests, DoubleClick and Abacus Announce Plans for
$1 Billion Merger, ELECTRONIC ADVERTISING & MARKETPLACE REP., June 29,
1999 (describing concerns that a merger of an online marketing firm with a
consumer data tracking information firm would threaten online privacy);
Joseph Gallivan, Privacy Group Calls for DoubleClick Nix, N.Y. POST, June
22, 1999, at 39. Descriptions of the cookies’ privacy threat also began
appearing in legal scholarship. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of
Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1486–90 (2000).
12. See In re Toys R Us, Inc., Privacy Litig., No. M-00-1381, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16947, at *18, *27 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2001); Chance v. Avenue A.,
Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1162 (W.D. Wash. 2001); In re DoubleClick, Inc.,
Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 526 (S.D.N.Y 2001).
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the Internet failed to provide a comprehensive solution. 13
Consequently, the law, in effect, produced a legal
pronouncement permitting collection of personal information on
the Internet.
Legal regulation was not the only potential mode of
regulation for the collection of personal information on the
Internet. Two other modes were tried: industry self-regulation
and technological solutions. However, neither of these proved
effective in containing information collection practices. 14
Unsurprisingly, the findings of a survey I have conducted
of empirical data measuring the use of privacy-threatening
Internet technologies revealed that the practice of collecting
personal information and commercial profiling is booming. 15
At the same time, it appears that concerns about the privacy
threat posed by the Internet have not made any evident impact
on the diffusion of the technology. In the period between 20002003, when users became increasingly aware of the threat to
their Internet privacy, the U.S. online population expanded
13. See Elaine M. Laflamme, Privacy is Becoming a Company Affair:
Protecting Personal Information Means More than Posting Policies on Web
Sites, N.Y. L.J., Jun. 10, 2002, at S6; JOSEPH TUROW, ANNENBERG PUB. POL’Y
CTR., AMERICANS & ONLINE PRIVACY: THE SYSTEM IS BROKEN 8 (2003),
available at http://www.asc.upenn.edu/usr/jturow/internet-privacy-report/36page-turow-version-9.pdf. An agreement between the Attorneys’ General of
Arizona, California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, Vermont, and Washington and DoubleClick, Inc. provides
an example of states’ response to problems with the collection of personal
information. See Agreement between the Attorneys General of the States of
Arizona, California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, Vermont, and Washington, and Doubleclick Inc., In re
DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (No. 00
Civ
0641
NRB),
available
at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/aug/aug26a_02_attach.pdf;
Press
Release, Office of the N.Y. State Attorney Gen., Major Online Advertisers
Agrees to Privacy Standards for Online Tracking: Company to Increase
Visibility and Verify Data Collection Practices (Aug. 26, 2002), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/aug/aug26a_02.html;
For legislation
and case law restricting use of spyware see CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22947
CODE
ANN.
§
13-40-102
(West
2005);
(West
2007);
UTAH
Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive Co., LLC., et al., v. The Gator Corp.,
No. Civ.A.02-909-A, 2002 WL 31356645, at *1 (E.D. Va. July 16, 2002). In
addition, many states and the federal government have new spyware bills.
See Securely Protect Yourself against Cyber Trespass Act, H.R. REP. NO. 10932 (2005). See generally Patricia L. Bellia, Spyware and the Limits of
Surveillance Law, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1283 (2005) (discussing the
application of privacy law to spyware).
14. Bernstein, supra note 5, at 268-70.
15. Id. at 270-2.
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from eighty-six million in 2000, to one hundred and twenty-six
million in 2003. 16
Hence, the collection of personal information on the
Internet portrays a mirror image of the privacy-diffusion
relationship paradox evidenced in the case of genetic
discrimination.
The use of privacy-threatening Internet
devices that enable the collection and use of personal
information on the Internet is constantly increasing. Yet, the
diffusion of Internet technology is not affected.
II. USE OF DIFFUSION CHARACTERISTICS TO IDENTIFY
TECHNOLOGICAL SUSCEPTIBILITY
Understanding the characteristics that made genetic
testing and the Internet susceptible to these privacy-diffusion
relationships is a first step toward resolving the privacy
paradoxes of genetic discrimination and the Internet.
Furthermore, technologies are often not as unique as they
appear at first blush.
Identifying the technological
characteristics that created the genetic testing and Internet
privacy-diffusion relationships could inform decision-making
regarding other technologies that share the same
characteristics. Early identification of these characteristics
could serve as an important tool in the hands of those in charge
of regulating new technologies.
In this Part, I identify two diffusion characteristics that
made genetic testing susceptible to its problematic diffusionprivacy relationship: (i) its preventive nature and (ii) its nontriable quality.
I also point to two different diffusion
characteristics that made Internet technology vulnerable to its
respective privacy-diffusion relationship: (i) its critical mass
quality and (ii) its decentralized nature. 17
16. See MARY MADDEN, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, AMERICAS’
ONLINE PURSUITS: THE CHANGING PICTURE OF WHO’S ONLINE AND WHAT
THEY
DO
ii
(2003),
available
at
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Online_Pursuits_Final.PDF.
17. Two additional factors may have contributed to the development of the
two privacy-diffusion relationships. First, the Internet privacy-diffusion
relationship is likely also a result of the invisible nature of Internet
monitoring. Individuals cannot see cookies, web bugs, and spyware. Even
individuals who are knowledgeable about Internet monitoring are not
constantly reminded that commercial entities are monitoring their Internet
conduct. Consequently, people are less likely to react to the privacy threat.
For a more detailed discussion of the invisible monitoring factor, see, Gaia
Bernstein, When New Technologies Are Still New: Windows of Opportunity for
Privacy Protection, 51 VILL. L. REV. 921 (2006). Second, the sensitivity of
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A. GENETIC TESTING: A PREVENTIVE TECHNOLOGY
Preventive innovations are technologies aimed at avoiding
unwanted consequences. The rewards to the individual from
adopting a preventive innovation are often delayed in time.
The unwanted results may not occur right away or may never
occur at all. They are also relatively intangible. 18 Examples of
preventive innovations are using car seat belts, adoption of soil
conservation practices, being screened for breast cancer, getting
inoculations against a disease, flossing one’s teeth, and testing
for HIV/AIDS. 19
Genetic testing is also a preventive technology. 20 The goal
of the genetic test is to detect the probability for disease in
advance in order to take preventive measures where possible or
make informed life decisions. Yet, most genetic diseases are
not certain to develop even when an individual carries the
genetic mutation. 21 Even if the individual will eventually
develop the disease, this could take place well into the future.

medical information may have contributed to the genetic discrimination
privacy-diffusion relationship. Individuals are very sensitive about disclosing
their medical information, particularly due to the grave consequences of losing
one’s insurance. Yet, it appears that individuals’ reactions to threats on their
personal medical information are also context and technology related.
Although Internet users express great concern about the collection of their
personal health information on the Internet and take some measures not to
disclose their personally identifiable information, the majority of Internet
users research health issues on the Internet. Furthermore, during the period
in which the public became aware of privacy concerns on the Internet the
percentage of Internet users that sought health information on the Internet
increased from 54% in 2000 to 66% in 2003. See CA. HEALTHCARE FOUND.
AND INTERNET HEALTHCARE COALITION, ETHICS SURVEY OF CONSUMER
ATTITUDES ABOUT HEALTH WEB SITES 4 (2000), available at http://www.ch
cf.org/topics/view.cfm?itemID=12493; HEALTH PRIVACY PROJECT, HEALTH
PRIVACY
POLLING
DATA
(2004),
available
at
http://www.healthprivacy.org/usr_doc/poling_data.pdf; PEW INTERNET & AM.
LIFE PROJECT, HEALTH INFORMATION ONLINE ii, 3, (2005), available at
http://www.pew internet.org/pdfs/PIP_Healthtopics_May05.pdf.
18. EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 234-36 (5th ed.
2003).
19. Id. at 233.
20. For a study focusing on the effects of the preventive nature of genetic
testing technology, see generally Katrina Armstrong et al., Early Adoption of
BRCA1/2 Testing: Who and Why, 5 GENETICS IN MED. 92, 96 (2003).
21. For example, a woman who carries the genetic mutation for breast
cancer (BRCA1 or BRCA2) has a 50% to 85% chance of incurring the disease.
Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr., Breast/Ovarain Cancer: BRCA1 &
BRCA2, http://www.mskcc.org/mskcc/html/8623.cfm (last visited Apr. 28,
2007).
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Such benefits are not tangible and do not provide an immediate
reward.
Preventive innovations are characterized by a low diffusion
rate—the technology tends to diffuse slowly and relatively few
individuals adopt it. 22 Preventive technologies have a lower
adoption rate because of their weaker relative advantage.
Relative advantage is one of the most important predictors of a
technology’s adoption. 23 Relative advantage is comprised of the
economic profitability, social prestige, low initial cost, decrease
in comfort, savings in time and effort, and the immediacy of the
reward. 24 Preventive innovations do not provide an immediate
reward, but instead promise rewards that are distant in time
and uncertain in nature. Furthermore, it is difficult to perceive
the unwanted event because it is a non-event. Since preventive
technologies have a weaker relative advantage, people are less
likely to adopt them.
The preventive nature of genetic testing technology
exacerbates the privacy threats imposed by the technology.
Where the technology is preventive and individuals are already
disinclined to adopt it, any additional problem including a
privacy threat is likely to play a more significant role.
Consequently, genetic testing technology was susceptible to the
first privacy-diffusion paradox, where diffusion is inhibited
despite the absence of an actual privacy threat.
Other
technologies
that
share
the
preventive
technology
characteristic also have a higher likelihood of being entrapped
in this relationship.
B. GENETIC TESTING: A NON-TRIABLE TECHNOLOGY
The triability of an innovation is the degree to which a user
can experiment with a technology on a limited basis. 25 Users
perceive triability as important because it reduces risk and
uncertainty about the consequences of using an innovation. It
provides adopters a risk free way to explore and experiment
with the technology.
Experimentation increases users’
comfort. 26 Consequently, new ideas that can be divided for
22. ROGERS, supra note 18, at 233–35.
23. Id at 233.
24. Id. at 232–34.
25. Id. at 258 (while Rogers refers to the concept as “trialability” I prefer
to use the similar term “triability”).
26. See Elena Karahanna et al., Information Technology Adoption Across
Time: A Cross-Sectional Comparison of Pre-Adoption and Post-Adoption
Beliefs, 23 MIS Q. 183, 185–86 (1999).
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trial are generally adopted faster. 27
Genetic testing, on the other hand, is a non-triable
technology—it does not lend itself to limited experimentation.
Most potential users of genetic testing are members of families
inflicted by a disease who consider testing for the specific
disease that is prevalent in their family. Once they test the
information, their genetic carrier status is created and can
affect self-conceptions or be abused by third-parties. 28
Furthermore, unlike other types of personal information, the
created genetic information is immutable. 29 Consequently,
users of genetic testing technology are generally first time
users or potential adopters. Further, even if an individual
would decide to undergo a battery of genetic tests, use of the
technology would in most cases still remain a one-time event.
Additionally, there are five typical groups of adopter
categories: innovators, early adopters, early majority, late
majority, and laggards. 30 Genetic testing, due to its slow
diffusion rate, is still in the early-adopter stage. 31 Earlier
adopters of an innovation tend to perceive triability as more
important than later adopters. Earlier adopters are more
affected by the triability of the technology because their use of
the technology serves as a kind of vicarious trial for later
adopters. 32 Consequently, users of genetic testing technology
are particularly affected by the non-triable nature of the
technology.
The non-triable nature of genetic testing technology also
exacerbates the privacy threat.
First, like preventive
technologies, non-triable technologies have a slower diffusion

27. ROGERS, supra note 18, at 258.
28. Armstrong et al., supra note 20, at 95-97. For a discussion of the
potential effects of genetic information on conceptions of the self see generally
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudence of Genetics,
45 VAND. L. REV. 313 (1992).
29. While an individual may be able to change her credit rating she will
never be able to change her genetic information.
30. ROGERS, supra note 18, at 282–85.
31. See Michael Hall & Olunfunmilayo I. Olopade, Confronting Genetic
Testing Disparities: Knowledge Is Power, 293 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1783, 1784–85
(2005) (explaining why physicians are reluctant to order genetic testing);
Louise Wideroff et al., Physician Use of Genetic Testing for Cancer
Susceptibility: Results of a National Survey, 12 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY,
BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 295 (2003) (describing the limited use of cancer
susceptibility tests).
32. ROGERS, supra note 18, at 258.
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rate. 33 Individuals are less likely to adopt a technology that
cannot be tried out. The inability to experiment with a
technology aggravates any concerns regarding its ramifications,
since once it is used the individual has to bear the full brunt of
the implications. In the case of genetic testing, an individual
considering whether to be tested, fears that by the act of taking
the test she may expose herself to the full consequences of
genetic discrimination.
Second, potential adopters of a technology are more
affected by privacy threats than individuals that already used
the technology. Social norms play a greater role when a
behavior is new. As the behavior becomes more ritualized,
habits begin to exert a stronger influence and the effect of
social norms weakens.
Thus, experience decreases the
influence of social norms. 34 A study that compared preadoption and post-adoption behavior found that the social
compatibility of a technology affected the decisions of preadopters, but did not play a significant role in the decisions of
individuals already using the technology. 35 Genetic testing
technology cannot be tried on an experimental basis. Its use is
usually a one-time event. Consequently, the non-triable nature
of the technology affects the type of users: most users of genetic
testing are either first time users or potential adopters as
opposed to experienced users. Their decisions are, therefore,
particularly vulnerable to the privacy threats.
It appears that the non-triable nature of genetic testing
technology aggravates the privacy threat.
Individuals
examining non-triable technologies are extra cautious about
the adoption decision. Therefore, genetic testing technology is
susceptible to the paradoxical situation evidenced in the case of
genetic discrimination where individuals do not adopt the
technology despite the actual absence of a privacy threat.

C. INTERNET TECHNOLOGY: A CRITICAL MASS POINT
TECHNOLOGY
Network effects exist where the value of the good is
33. See id.
34. Ronald Thompson et al., Influence of Experience on Personal Computer
Utilization: Testing a Conceptual Model, 11 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS. 167, 173,
181–82 (1994).
35. Karahanna et al., supra note 26
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dependent on the number of individuals who use it. Interactive
technologies, such as the telephone, the fax, or the Internet, are
often characterized by “network effects.” The interactive
nature of communication technologies creates interdependence
between adopters in the system. An interactive communication
is of little use to people unless others adopt it. For instance,
the telephone became more desirable once it became more
widespread and there were additional people to call. 36 Network
effects become prominent as a critical mass of people starts
using a technology. 37
Once the critical mass point is reached, the rate of adoption
accelerates. 38 Thus, when a technology reaches the critical
mass point, social norms regarding its use become quickly
entrenched. 39 Moreover, a technology that diffuses rapidly and
is extensively adopted is less likely to be abandoned. The
telephone, for example, has become such an integral part of our
professional and personal lives, that it is practically impossible
for an individual to unilaterally discontinue use of the phone. 40

36. See Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence
of Network Externalities, 94 J. POL. ECON. 822, 822–23 (1986); Mark Lemley &
David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479,
481, 483 (1998); M. Lynne Markus, Toward a “Critical Mass” Theory of
Interactive Media, in ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY 194
(Janet Fulk & Charles Steinfield eds., 1990).
37. Technologies characterized by network effects that reach critical mass
also manifest a different demand curve. Demand does not grow as price
decreases, but instead as demand grows the price may increase. See
NICHOLAS ECONOMIDES & CHARLES HIMMELBERG, CRITICAL MASS AND
NETWORK SIZE WITH APPLICATION TO THE US FAX MARKET 1 (Stern School of
Business, N.Y. Univ., Discussion Paper No. EC-95-11, 1995), available at
http://raven.stern.nyu.edu/networks/95-11.pdf.
38. ROGERS, supra note 18, at 343–45. For example, the fax boom started
in 1983 when the price for faxes was reduced dramatically. Yet, diffusion was
slow until 1987 when the critical mass point was reached. From that point on,
however, diffusion accelerated at a rapid pace. Id.
39. A social norm regarding use of a technology exists when it is effective
in directing behavior regarding the technology. See Symposium, Decentralized
Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the
New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1661–66 (1996).
40. Rogers notes that the critical mass effect could theoretically accelerate
discontinuance. He points out that if people would stop responding to emails
others may decide that email is no longer an effective mode of communication.
However, he concludes that such a rejection of email is unlikely today due to
the breadth of its spread. See ROGERS, supra note 18, at 353. For a
comprehensive discussion of the integration of the telephone into American
lives see CLAUDE S. FISCHER, AMERICA CALLING: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE
TELEPHONE TO 1940 (1992).
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Internet technology is considered a network effects
technology. The desirability of the Internet is dependent on the
number of people who use it. 41 Although the Internet existed
for decades before it became generally used, once it reached its
critical mass point in 1990, its adoption rate accelerated
exponentially. 42 In 1990, about 4 million users used the
Internet worldwide, while by 2002, that number had grown to
544 million users worldwide. 43 Privacy-threatening uses of the
Internet became common in the second half of the 1990s, at the
time that Internet diffusion was already growing at an
exponential pace.
Consequently, non-privacy norms were
quickly entrenched. Furthermore, at this point, when millions
became dependent on email and Internet for every day use,
privacy threats, no matter how intensive, were unlikely to
cause people to abandon the technology. It became impossible
for individuals to unilaterally discontinue use of a
communication mode utilized by so many others. Hence, the
critical mass point quality made the Internet susceptible to the
second problematic privacy-diffusion relationship, where
diffusion accelerated despite extensive privacy threats.
D. INTERNET TECHNOLOGY: A DECENTRALIZED TECHNOLOGY
A technology’s diffusion process can be either centralized or
decentralized. Innovations that are centrally diffused emerge
from an expert source that diffuses the innovation to potential
adopters who accept or reject the innovation. 44 For example,
genetic testing is a centrally diffused innovation—the medical
profession, primarily genetic counselors who administer the
tests, control its diffusion.
Other technologies have decentralized diffusion processes.
In these cases, the diffusion emerges horizontally via peer
networks—there is no central expert group in charge of
coordinating diffusion. Further, diffusion is accompanied by a

41. See Mark Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.KENT. L. REV. 1257, 1281 (1998).
42. The Internet was not an overnight success. It was invented long
before it reached critical mass. Several potential dates for the “conception” of
the Internet include: the 1964 invention of packet switching; the 1969
commencement of operation of the ARPAnet; or 1989 when commercial
Internet service providers started offering services to the general public. See
Gisle Hannemyr, The Internet as Hyperbole: A Critical Examination of
Adoption Rates, 19 INFO. SOC. 111, 114 (2003).
43. ROGERS, supra note 18, at 343-47.
44. Id. at 394–98.
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high degree of reinvention of the innovation. Users of the
technology, in the process of adopting and implementing the
technology, act to change and modify it. Members of the user
system have the ability to make sound decisions about how the
diffusion system should be managed. 45
The Internet is a prime example of an innovation, which
has a decentralized diffusion process. From its inception, the
Internet was diffused and developed by its users and not
controlled by a central group of experts. 46 The absence of a
controlling group that upholds privacy norms, combined with
the ability of any user to transform the Internet’s architecture,
led to the development and spread of privacy-infringing tools,
such as cookies and spyware. Hence, the decentralized nature
of the Internet amplified the effect of its critical mass point
quality (and related network effects) in producing a quick
entrenchment of commercial non-privacy norms, thereby
increasing its susceptibility to the second problematic privacydiffusion relationship. 47
III. DIFFUSION CHARACTERISTICS AS A POLICY TOOL
The two privacy-diffusion paradoxes exhibit a divergence
from the general preference for a balance between diffusion and
privacy protection. Society generally rejects extensive diffusion
and widespread adoption of a new technology that significantly
erodes privacy. At the same time, society also disfavors the
inhibition of the diffusion of important technologies due to
privacy threats. 48
In this Part, I assess potential resolutions to the genetic
discrimination and Internet privacy-diffusion relationships.
My objective goes beyond proposing specific resolutions.
Decision-makers dealing with the regulation of new
45. See id. at 180, 394–398; DUNCAN J. WATTS, SIX DEGREES: THE
SCIENCE OF A CONNECTED AGE 50-55 (2003); Brian Butler & Deborah E.
Gibbons, Power Distribution as a Catalyst and Consequence of Decentralized
Technology Diffusion, in INFORMATION SYSTEMS INNOVATION AND DIFFUSION:
ISSUES AND DIRECTIONS 4–5, 12–13 (Tor J. Larson & Eugene McGuire eds.,
1997).
46. See Steven R. Salbu, Who Should Govern the Internet?: Monitoring
and Supporting a New Frontier, 11 HARV J.L & TECH. 429, 435–36 (1998);
Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture
and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815, 832 (2004).
47. See STEVEN A. HETCHER, NORMS IN A WIRED WORLD 245, 250, 274
(2004) (describing the creation of privacy-threatening norms).
48. Bernstein, supra note 5, at 251-53.
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technologies often assess each new technology in isolation. Yet,
there are definite patterns in the co-evolution of technology and
society that can be used to identify similar problems confronted
by other new technologies. I propose that undertaking a
generalized approach that looks beyond a specific technology
can be an important tool in improving decision-making
regarding the regulation of new technologies. 49 In particular, I
suggest that such an approach would be useful in resolving and
preventing problematic privacy-diffusion relationships. Other
technologies
that
share
the
technological
diffusion
characteristics that made genetic testing and the Internet
susceptible to their respective privacy-diffusion relationships
may also be entrapped in these relationships. Policy solutions
based on the identification of the technological diffusion
attributes that made genetic testing and the Internet
vulnerable to these suspect relationships can be helpful in
preventing other technologies from becoming entrapped in the
same situations. At the same time, the conclusions I present
here are based on privacy controversies involving only two
technologies.
Consequently, I seek to provide an initial
framework for incorporating technological diffusion attributes
into technology-specific legal decision-making that would be
refined with further study of additional technologies.
A. REGULATING PREVENTIVE NON-TRIABLE AND CENTRALIZED
TECHNOLOGIES
Technologies that are preventive and non-triable
exacerbate privacy threats and are, therefore, prone to the first
privacy-diffusion paradox. These technologies are more likely
to be entrapped in a situation where, although a privacy threat
does not exist, individuals perceive a risk and are consequently
reluctant to use the technology.
Where a technology’s diffusion attributes make it likely
that the perception of a privacy threat will affect its diffusion,
the expressive role of the law in dispelling such misperceptions
is of particular importance. The law has an expressive function
that is distinguished from its coercive function. The law’s
coercive function affects behavior through enforcement by force,

49. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, CHANNELING TECHNOLOGY THROUGH LAW 6
(1973); Arie Rip & Johan W. Schot, Identifying Loci for Influencing the
Dynamics of Technological Development, in SHAPING TECHNOLOGY, GUIDING
POLICY: CONCEPTS, SPACES AND TOOLS 155, 155 (Knut H. Sørensen & Robin
Williams eds., 2002).
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while the law’s expressive function operates by sending a
message. It expresses normative principles and symbolizes
societal values. These moralizing features affect behavior. 50
The law’s expressive effect publicizes a societal consensus.
Where the law publicizes a consensus that a certain behavior is
required in order to comply with an abstract internalized norm,
the violation of the concrete obligation induces behavioral
change by producing guilt. 51
In the case of genetic discrimination, the law failed to
influence the public’s risk assessment. The general public
apparently did not perceive enough consensus in the partial
and inconsistent legal protection. Concerned genetic counselors
specifically pointed to the narrow scope of available legal
protections. 52
Decision-makers charged with the regulation of new
technologies make decisions that can be divided into three
categories according to their effects on users’ perceptions of
risk. The first category includes instances where the law
undertakes a clear-cut express restriction on uses of the
technology that threaten privacy. The second category includes
cases where the law undertakes a hesitant stance that includes
inconsistent restrictions on privacy-threatening uses of the
technology. In these cases prohibitions are often combined
with inaction or even contradictory statements that may be
interpreted as a legal endorsement of these privacy-threatening
uses. 53 This ambiguous stance produces uncertainty that may
inhibit use of the technology. Finally, the third category
includes cases where the law may endorse a blanket clear-cut
express legal pronouncement not to restrict certain privacythreatening uses of the technology. 54
The law regulating genetic discrimination reflects the
50. See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of
Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1508 (2000); Richard H.
McAdams, The Origin, Development and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 338, 398 (1997); Steven D. Smith, Expressivist Jurisprudence and the
Depletion of Meaning, 60 MD. L. REV. 506, 510, 515 (2001).
51. See McAdams, supra note 50, at 400–09.
52. See Hall & Rich, supra note 4, at 252–53.
53. Complex privacy balancing schemes and legal efforts to regulate
indirectly, for example, through changing market incentives, also fall under
this category.
54. The collection of personal information on the Internet evidenced this
type of legal reaction. In this case, the law expressly proclaimed that this use
of the Internet does not constitute a privacy threat.
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second approach; the patchwork of state laws and weak federal
protections produces a hesitant and contradictory approach.
This creates an uncertainty that inhibits the use of genetic
testing technology.
Rules in the first category—those providing clear-cut and
express restrictions—are more likely to influence individuals’
risk perceptions regarding the use of technologies that are
preventive and non-triable. Imposing a legal rule that sends a
clearer message and clarifies an emerging norm consensus is
important in engaging with potential users’ risk assessment. 55
The expressive function of the law plays a significant role in
regulating technology. The mere exercise of centralized control
can allay public fears regarding potential threatening uses of a
new technology. Individuals are often afraid of the unknown
and, therefore, are put at ease when legal principles are
exercised to govern new technologies. People are reassured by
the mere existence of limits that the technology is under
control. 56
The law’s expressive function plays a particularly
important role when dealing with preventive technologies. A
study on AIDS testing, another preventive technology, stressed
the importance of addressing not only the threat itself but also
the perception of risk, that is, the attitudes and beliefs about
the threat among those who are potential users.
It
acknowledged that reducing the actual level of risk would not
necessarily reduce the perceived risk. 57
The need to influence the public perception of risk is,
therefore, particularly crucial in the case of preventive and
non-triable technologies, such as genetic testing. A clear legal
message, in lieu of a partial and inconsistent one, would help to
alleviate public fears. 58 Specifically, the failure of the current

55. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of
Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901, 1925-26 (2000).
56. See Lyria Bennett Moses, Understanding Legal Responses to
Technological Change: The Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J. L. SCI.
& TECH. 505, 527-28 (2005).
57. See Scott Burris, Driving the Epidemic Underground? A New Look at
Law and the Social Risk of HIV Testing, 12 AIDS & PUB. POL’Y J. 66 (1997).
58. Commentators generally advocate that legal regulation is more
effective in the form of “gentle nudges” over “hard shoves.” See generally Dan
M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem,
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000); Sarah E. Waldeck, Using Male Circumcision to
Understand Social Norms as Multipliers, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 455 (2003). Yet,
the change advocated here is not targeted at coercing the behavior of those
who impose a threat. It does not propose stricter sanctions. It is aimed at
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patchwork of state and federal laws to allay individuals’ public
fears points to the need for a comprehensive federal statute.
The clear message embodied in such a statute would alleviate
public fears and misperceptions that are currently impeding
the diffusion of genetic testing technology. 59
A third distinctive diffusion attribute of genetic testing
technology is its centralized diffusion process. The medical
profession, particularly genetic counselors, serves as the
gatekeeper of the technology. It has enormous influence on the
diffusion of the technology. 60 Consequently, when a technology
is centrally diffused, intervention measures should target the
group that controls the diffusion process.
Intervention
measures seeking to dispel a misperception of risk should
follow a similar course. Education regarding the scope of legal
protection measures and the actual risk should be focused at
that group.
This insight can be applied to the case of genetic
discrimination. Genetic professionals currently play a major
role in spreading fears and concerns regarding genetic
discrimination. Their knowledge about the law is limited and
their distrust is broad. When questioned about their concerns,
genetic counselors repeatedly pointed to the desirability of a
federal law to replace the current anxiety-provoking patchwork
of state laws. 61 Consequently, intervention efforts should focus
on promoting awareness among genetic professionals. These
efforts should involve: (i) education regarding the relevant
those who should feel protected by the laws by sending a clearer message of
the social consensus.
59. See Geer et al., supra note 6, at 30–31. See also Henry T. Greely,
Genotype Discrimination: The Complex Case for Some Legislative Protection,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1483 (2001); Hall & Rich, supra note 4, at 252–53.
Rothstein and Hornung warn that discrimination would take place once more
individuals learn that they are at a genetically increased risk of serious illness
and purchase additional life insurance. See generally Mark A. Rothstein &
Carlton A. Hornung, Public Attitudes, in GENETICS AND LIFE INSURANCE:
MEDICAL UNDERWRITING AND SOCIAL POLICY 1 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 2004).
One should not rule out the possibility that a federal statute’s success in
resolving the immediate problem of under-utilization of genetic testing
technology might prompt insurers to discriminate. However, the existence of a
comprehensive federal statute would be effective in resolving the problem of
discrimination as well.
60. For the influence of moderators in the diffusion of new technologies,
see Joshua Mark Greenberg, From Betamax to Blockbuster: Mediation in the
Consumption Junction (Aug. 2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell
University) (on file with Connecticut Law Review).
61. Hall & Rich, supra note 4, at 252–53.
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laws, in particular should a comprehensive genetic
discrimination federal law be enacted; and (ii) dispelling the
disinformation regarding current practices of genetic
discrimination. Since genetic testing technology is centrally
diffused, concentrating resources on the group that controls
diffusion is likely to prove particularly effective.
B. REGULATING CRITICAL MASS AND DECENTRALIZED
TECHNOLOGIES
Technologies that are characterized by a critical mass point
(and related network effects) and decentralized diffusion are
prone to the second suspect privacy-diffusion paradox where
diffusion accelerates despite an extensive privacy threat.
Where decision-makers view technologies that are
characterized by a critical mass point and decentralized
diffusion as entrapped in a problematic privacy-diffusion
relationship, the timing of the intervention is of the essence. 62
Decision-makers generally have two main intervention options:
early intervention at the outset of diffusion or the adoption of a
wait-and-see approach to evaluate the effects of the technology
before regulating. 63
The early intervention approach carries with it the obvious
hazards of regulating the unknown—groping in the dark before
informed decisions can be made. Consequently, in many
instances the wait-and-see approach is the preferred choice. 64

62. For an in-depth discussion of the appropriate timing for intervention
for purposes of privacy protection see generally Bernstein, supra note 17.
63. See generally ROGER B. DWORKIN, LIMITS: THE ROLE OF THE LAW IN
BIOETHICAL DECISION MAKING 169–71 (1996); Stuart Minor Benjamin,
Proactive Legislation and the First Amendment, 99 MICH. L. REV. 281, 320
(2000); Moses, supra note 56, at 515-17. A legal pronouncement not to restrict
technological uses may be misperceived as a wait-and-see stand. Such
pronouncements, however, constitute legal actions that not only affect social
norms but also require direct legal action should later legal change be desired.
64. See Hernan Galperin & François Bar, The Regulation of Interactive
Television in the United States and the European Union, 55 FED. COMM. L.J.
61 (2002) (describing the wait–and-see approach taken by American regulators
with regard to interactive television); Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The
End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the
Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001) (describing the FCC’s wait–andsee approach regarding the regulation of cable Internet access).
For
commentators supporting the wait–and-see approach, see DWORKIN, supra
note 63, at 169–70. See generally Benjamin, supra note 63. For commentators
criticizing the wait-and-see approach, see generally Matthew Fagin et al.,
Beyond Napster: Using Antitrust Law to Advance and Enhance Online Music
Distribution, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 451 (2002); Moses, supra note 56.
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Social norms related to the use of technologies that are
characterized by a critical mass point and decentralized
diffusion process tend to become quickly entrenched. Law and
social norms literature demonstrates that a legal rule is less
likely to be effective where it departs substantially from the
prevailing norm.
For example, a compulsory attendance
statute that required school attendance until age twenty-one is
likely to be ineffective in influencing parental commitment
norms. 65 The law tends to be more effective in influencing
social norms when a new rule is consistent with community
expectations. 66
Recent attempts to regulate social norms in the area of
intellectual property underscore these insights.
Studies
showed that laws criminalizing the misappropriation of various
forms of intellectual property are ineffective.
Despite
prohibitive laws, the unauthorized use of software and taping
of music CDs and videotapes continues on a large scale. It
appears that people do not conceive this behavior as immoral.
The disparity between social norms of morality and the law
affects the law’s legitimacy and reduces its effectiveness. 67
In the case of new technologies, the cost of the lost
opportunity to intervene is particularly high because of the
additional flexibility available when a new technology first
enters society. New technologies, especially those enveloped in
a revolutionary aura, tend to enter society with a relatively
clean slate. An initial time period exists in which uses and
social norms surrounding the innovation are in flux. However,
after a certain point they stabilize and reach a certain closure.
From that point onward, change is less likely. 68
Consequently, express legal prohibitions on uses of a
technology that threaten privacy are less effective once social
65. Kahan, supra note 58, at 608; Scott, supra note 55, at 1926–28.
66. Scott, supra note 55, at 1926–28.
67. See Ben Depoorter et al., Gentle Nudges v. Hard Shoves in Copyright
Law: An Empirical Study on the Conflict Between Norms and Enforcement
(Ghent Ctr. for Advanced Studies in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 6, June
2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=740184; Stuart P. Green,
Plagiarism, Norms and the Limits of Theft Law: Some Observations on the Use
of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54 HASTINGS
L.J. 167, 173, 236-38 (2002); see also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic
Code, Social Norms and the Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping
Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505 (2003).
68. See WIEBE E. BIJKER, OF BICYCLES, BAKELITES AND BULBS 84–85
(1995).

BERNSTEIN G. The Role of Diffusion Characteristics in Formulating a General Theory of Law
and Technology. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2007;8(2):623-644.

2007]

THE ROLE OF DIFFUSION CHARACTERISTICS

643

norms are entrenched. Decision-makers considering regulation
to restrict uses of technologies that have a critical mass point
and decentralized diffusion process need to particularly focus
on the issue of timing. Yet, early intervention should not be
promoted across the board. The uncertainties accompanying
early intervention suggest that such a course should be
pursued infrequently. I suggest, however, that where
technologies manifest the characteristics of critical mass point
and decentralized diffusion, decision-makers should include
timing as an important factor in their decision-making. 69
Non-privacy norms became entrenched, in the case of the
Internet, after the critical mass point. While the critical mass
point was reached in 1990, non-privacy norms emerged around
the mid-1990s. Many academics and policy-makers advocated
resorting to self-regulation and market resolutions. 70 Yet, with
the benefit of hindsight these efforts have failed. 71 Decisionmakers have not, to this point, restricted commercial profilers’
or employers’ ability to use privacy-threatening Internet
devices. As discussed, such measures are likely to be less
effective now due to the current entrenchment of non-privacy
norms. 72 Had decision-makers been aware of the sensitivity of
the timing decision due to the critical mass point quality and
the decentralized diffusion process, they may have elected a
different route. This emphasizes the need to identify the
relevant diffusion attributes at an earlier stage when the
problematic privacy-diffusion relationship can be more
effectively resolved.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have used two techno-privacy
controversies to show that diffusion characteristics could be
69. Others have suggested manipulation of the underlying social norms.
See, e.g., Depoorter et al., supra note 67, at 13–14.
70. For examples of such proposals see Steven A. Hetcher, The Emergence
of Website Privacy Norms, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 97, 122 (2001);
David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1371–72, 1387 (1996); FED. TRADE
COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE. COMMISSION ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON ONLINE ACCESS AND SECURITY (2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/acoas/papers/acoasfinal1.pdf.
71. See CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., PRIVACY SELF
REGULATION: A DECADE OF DISAPPOINTMENT (2005), available at
http://www.epic.org/reports/decadedisappoint.pdf.
72. See Bernstein, supra note 17 (comparing the effectiveness of children
Internet privacy regulation and spam regulation).
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useful as a policy tool in the resolution and potential prevention
of future controversies involving technologies that share the
same diffusion characteristics. This Article is based on limited
case studies and, therefore, can offer only an initial formulation
for the use of diffusion characteristics. My hope is that I have
demonstrated that a middle-ground exists between treating
each technology as unique and therefore deserving special
treatment and the formulation of overly broad principles that
bluntly erode the very novelty we want to promote.

